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Users’ Concern for Privacy in
Context-Aware Reasoning Systems
Matthias Forstmann, Alberto Giaretta, and Jennifer Renoux
Abstract—Context-aware reasoning systems allow drawing so-
phisticated inferences about users’ behaviour and physiological
condition, by aggregating data from seemingly unrelated sources.
We conducted a general population online survey to evaluate
users’ concern about the privacy of data gathered by these
systems. We found that people are more concerned about third
parties accessing data gathered by environmental sensors as
compared to physiological sensors. Participants also indicated
greater concern about unfamiliar third parties (e.g., private
companies) as opposed to familiar third parties (e.g., relatives).
We further found that these concerns are predicted and (to a
lesser degree) causally affected by people’s beliefs about how
much can be inferred from these types of data, as well as by
their background in computer science.
Index Terms—internet of things, privacy, trust, context aware
systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Just a decade ago, the Internet of Things (IoT) was con-
sidered a utopian, life-changing technology. The IoT would
have contributed to the vision of a future full of interconnected
appliances and sensors, making our daily lives easier and more
convenient than ever. Fast-forward to today, that vision became
a reality. Our lives are permeated with smart devices, ranging
from wearable sensors such as smart watches, to entire smart
houses riddled with motion sensors, pressure sensors, and even
body sensors for real-time health monitoring. Yet, the more
pervasive new technologies become, the more privacy and
security issues arise.
Modern context-aware systems not only can sense and adapt
to their environment, but also are capable of inferring higher-
order information from aggregate sensor data [1]. In other
words, while individual sensor data may not be sufficient to
determine which specific activity a user is engaging in, the
combination of multiple sources of data may allow drawing
more sophisticated inferences. For example, by combining data
from bed pressure sensors and a heart rate monitor (sensors
types that individually produce comparably basic data), it is
theoretically possible to infer that a user is exercising or having
sex. While the average user may be not concerned by the
former kind of data leakage, they may well be when the latter
is. Yet, we suggest that most users are not fully aware of these
inference possibilities and would otherwise adopt a different
attitude towards such systems.
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In this article, we present the results of an empirical study,
conducted to determine how knowledge about the possibility
of inferring higher-order information from basic sensor data
predicts potential users’ concern about who accesses what
kind of personal data. In addition, we investigated whether
indirect knowledge about data security (using knowledge about
computers as a proxy) affects these concerns.
A. Context-Aware Systems and the Internet of Things
Current context-aware systems typically use pervasive com-
puting to capture information about the users’ environment
and infer activities such as cooking, sleeping, working out,
or leaving the house [2]. The addition of wearable sensors
to these activity recognition systems, especially in the form of
smart phones and smart watches, makes it possible to increase
the range of recognisable activities, for example in the domains
of personal well-being or outdoor activities [3]. However,
context recognition is more than just recognising activities: it
can similarly be applied to monitor health-related parameters
or to recognise emergency events. As more body sensors
become available, introducing them in context-aware systems
enables low-cost, real-time, and non-invasive monitoring of
users’ physiological condition [4].
Despite these advantages, the introduction of a large number
of sensors in people’s lives poses a threat to their privacy.
By design, in an IoT system, multiple types of devices (and
therefore their sensors) are directly or indirectly connected and
able to interact. Consequently, due to the fact that sensitive
information can be inferred by combining seemingly unrelated
data, the data collected needs to be handled in a secure manner
and users’ privacy guaranteed. Concerns about privacy aspects
of context-aware systems are indeed not unwarranted: the
sudden rise of demand for IoT devices lead companies to
spend less time on research and development, and to introduce
their products to the market as quickly as possible. In turn,
since the average customer does not perceive security as an
added value, other aspects of the product were prioritised.
As a result, a considerable number of products were shipped
with critical security flaws, from tea kettles to insulin pumps,
thermostats, baby monitors, home alarm systems, and X-Ray
systems [5]. Eventually, malicious actors started exploiting
these vulnerabilities, consolidating IoT devices in botnets and
delivering powerful DDoS attacks, such as the ones performed
by the Mirai malware in 2016 [6].
When deployed within the setup of a smart home, a context-
aware system might thus expose users to a number of privacy-
related risks. Malicious attackers might break into one, or
multiple, context-aware systems to steal sensitive data that
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have already been processed by the respective device (that
is, accessing information which the device was designed to
provide). Intruders might also implement their own reasoner
in the device, directly accessing sensors in order to indepen-
dently derive information about the victim that go beyond
the intended purpose of the device. While the former may
be the most straightforward approach, it is not necessarily the
easiest nor most profitable. Since the reasoner is one of the
most critical elements of a context-aware system, most effort
is typically spent securing this part of the system, while the
IoT sensors themselves are often left less protected, making
them an easier target for malicious third parties. As a result,
an attacker may be able to gather personal information about
the victim. Information that the victim does not even now it
can be inferred from the available sensors. Yet, why does it
matter whether or not an actor infers things about a user from
basic sensor data?
B. Trust and Perception of Privacy in IoT Systems
People fundamentally care about what others know about
them, and strategically control which information is available
to which social entity. Behind this motivation stands a desire to
have others think highly of usto think of us as honest, moral,
and friendly people (impression management [7]). Such an
external assessment is a prerequisite to fulfil our basic need to
belong, that is, our natural tendency to want to be an accepted
part of a social group [8]. As such, we take measures to assure
that information that may be detrimental to this cause does
not reach the publicthat only we can access it. This similarly
applies to the digital world: it has been argued that concern
for privacy, for example in instant messaging applications, is
due in part to peoples desire to manage others impression of
them [9].
In addition, access to sensitive information about us, or to
exclusive knowledge that we may have, can enable poten-
tially malicious third parties to exploit us, be it socially (by
threatening our social status), financially (by gaining access
to our resources), or even physically. Accordingly, research
shows that people indeed care about the privacy of their
data [10], for instance in the context of e-government [11],
e-commerce [12] or the use of RFID chips in products [13].
What has been established thus far is that concern for privacy
(defined by Westin (1967) as the claim of individuals [] to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others (p. 7))
has actual consequences for people’s behaviour, for example
in determining whether or not they want to use a given
system [14].
C. User’s Trust in IoT Devices
Interestingly, however, while people overtly claim to be
extraordinarily concerned about digital privacy, they seem
substantially less concerned about using everyday technologies
that can collect and process personal information [15]. They
seem to readily trust devices that can access private data, but
why?
As a fundamental building block of human cooperation,
people generally tend to trust one another. In other words, we
intuitively think of most other people as sincere, benevolent in
their intentions, and truthful in their communication [16]–[18].
This social orientation provides us with an essential sense of
safety and security [19], but carries with it the risk of being
exploited. In fact, people are aware that others may try to
mislead them, and they only trust them for as long as they
dont give them reasons not to [20].
Distrusting others requires more cognitive resources, be-
cause people have to engage in, for example, constant monitor-
ing and assessment of the distrusted party [18]. However, it can
be beneficial to detect malicious actors before they can harm
us. Whether we tend to distrust or trust another person depends
on certain personality variables [18], but also on situational
parameters. Specifically, depending on environmental variables
(for example, how much is at stake), a person must decide
whether or not trusting a third party is worth the risk [21]. As
a consequence, if people are not entirely in the know about
these situational parameters, they may wrongfully trust a third
party too readily. In the present case, not knowing about the
inferences that can be drawn from their personal data may
thus correspond to higher levels of trust towards context-aware
systems. In fact, research suggests that this privacy paradox
(i.e., being concerned about privacy while still using privacy-
threatening devices) occurs in the IoT domain, precisely
because people do not realise how knowledge about individual
activities can be aggregated to infer higher-order information,
resulting in a disregard for privacy protection [22]. According
to some theorising [23], this disregard is not just an end-user
problem, but a problem for society as a whole.
A recent technical report [24] sheds more light on IoT users’
privacy concerns. While they indicate considerable discomfort
at the thought of their data being sold to companies, the
majority of them admit that they do not fully understand their
devices or basic privacy threats. They admit to not knowing
how companies use their data, and only marginally care for this
information. Additionally, participants were proposed seven
different categories of IoT environments (e.g., their home,
private transportation, public market places) and, when asked
about how important is to them to be notified when data is
collected, they rated their own home and their own bodies as
the most critical environments (see also Bahirat et al. [25] and
Lee and Kobsa [26] for related investigations). In this study,
we focus on sensors used in those two environments.
To the best of our knowledge, there has to date neither
been an extensive investigation of users’ understanding of
the quantity of information that can be inferred from their
personal data, nor into how beliefs or knowledge about such
inferability affects their concern for privacy. Therefore, we
designed the present study to investigate if and how knowledge
about inferability of higher order information from basic IoT
sensors can predict users’ concern for privacy, and whether this
concern depends on the type of sensor data accessed and/or
the familiarity of the party potentially accessing this data.
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II. THE PRESENT RESEARCH
In the present research, our goal was to answer a set of
questions about users concern regarding the privacy of data
stemming from context-aware reasoning systems. In a first
step, we sought to assess peoples general level of concern
about different types of IoT devices (1). Subsequently, we
tested the hypothesis that greater knowledge about how much
can be inferred from sensor data predicted concern about
context-aware systems. This was implemented twofold. First,
we assessed participants general belief about how much can be
inferred from these data and tested how predictive this would
be of concern about others accessing their private data (2a).
Second, we tried to test whether strengthening participants
knowledge about the inferability of these data would increase
concern (2b). We then tested whether participants differentiate
in their concern between health-related and environmental
sensor data (3), and whether familiarity of parties potentially
accessing the different types of sensor data established in the
previous step would affect participants concern (4). Last, we
exploratorily analysed how general knowledge about data se-
curity (approximated via general computer knowledge) related
to concerns about different parties access to private data (5).
A. Participants and Design
A total of 304 participants were recruited via the online
crowd-sourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk),
in exchange for a modest monetary compensation. We refer
the reader to Buhrmester et al., for a discussion on MTurk
data quality [27]. Of those participants, 17 were excluded
from data analyses as they indicated on a single binary
item that they responded to one or multiple questions in
a random (or purposefully wrong) manner, leaving a final
sample of 287 participants (152 female, 134 male, 1 other;
MAge = 40.83, SD = 12.07). In addition to assessing their
person beliefs about inferability, participants were randomly
assigned to one of two conditions, either providing them with
additional information about inferences that could be drawn
from sensor data (info condition) or not (no-info condition).
B. Materials and Procedure
Upon consent, all participants were successively introduced
to 13 types of sensors, comprising environmental, biometric,
and physiological types (see Figure 1 for the complete list). In
the no-info condition, participants were only given little infor-
mation about what each sensor measures (e.g., ”Temperature
and humidity sensors are currently used to adjust the level
of a home thermostat and humidifier.”), while participants in
the info condition received additional information about what
kind of inferences could be drawn by combining these data
with other (e.g., ”Existing systems are able to infer that you
are showering or taking a bath, by using the level of humidity
and the temperature in your bathroom as indicators. Combined
with other indicators [] and in other locations it can also
be used to infer if you are toileting, doing your laundry or
cooking.”)
For each sensor, participants in both conditions were asked
to indicate on a single 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) how concerned they would
be about using such a sensor (general concern). In addition,
using the same scale, participants were asked for each sensor
how concerned they would be if the monitored values could be
accessed by them (exclusively), their relatives, their doctors,
a private organisation, and a public organisation, respectively.
Subsequently, as our main predictor variable, participants
answered two items assessing their general belief in how
much can be inferred from sensor data. The two items read
”I think it is possible to infer a great number of things
about my life/my behaviour from seemingly unrelated data”
and ”Sometimes, very elaborate things can be inferred from
combining simple measurements”. Participants were asked to
indicate their agreement on scales ranging from 1 (disagree
completely) to 9 (agree completely). Both items were highly
correlated (r(287) = .814, p < .001) and therefore averaged
into a single score representing participants beliefs about
inferability.
To conclude, participants provided basic demographic in-
formation (age, gender, nationality, level of education, etc.),
indicated whether they had an educational or work-related
background in computer science (yes/no), and answered on
a 7-point scale how much they generally knew about com-
puter science (very little to very much). Finally, participants
responded to the binary exclusion item referenced above.
C. Data reduction
For ease of data interpretation, we employed two data
reduction strategies, allowing us to create mean scores across
parties potentially accessing the data as well as the different
sensor types.
1) Data Access: We assumed a-priori that participants’
responses regarding their concern about who can access their
data would be explained by three underlying factors: access
by themselves, access by familiar others (relatives/doctors) and
access by unfamiliar/untrusted others (private/public organisa-
tions). The access by themselves category allows us to assess
how much users are generally receptive to the idea of having
certain IoT, without considering possible leaks or usage of data
by third parties. The access by familiar others and access by
unfamiliar others categories, conversely, allow us to consider
the degree of concern users have about others having access
to their data.
To test this model, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis [28]
using the R-package lavaan [29]. The model produced a
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of 0.971 and a Standardized
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) of 0.046, indicating
good fit to the data [30]. Standardized factor loadings were in
line with expectations for own access (fixed to 1.0 on factor
1), access by relatives and doctors (.819 and .913 on factor
2), as well as for access by private and public companies
(.958 and .994 on factor 3). Concern about access by familiar
others covaried positively with concern about own access
(β = .377, SE = .058, p < .001) and even more so with
concern about unfamiliar others’ access (β = .693, SE =
.036, p < .001), whereas concern about own access and
unfamiliar others’ access covaried marginally significant and
negatively (β = −.107, SE = .060, p = .073).
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Therefore, for all types of sensor data, we created mean
scores for concern about access by familiar and unfamiliar
others, and will primarily use those (in addition to the ”access
by self” score) in the remaining of this article.
2) Sensor Types: Using a similar approach, we tested
whether access concerns regarding the 13 different sensors
could be explained by a limited set of underlying factors. As
we did not have a-priori hypotheses about the factor structure,
we ran an exploratory principal-component factor analysis
across the aggregate concern-scores for the different sensor
types, using Oblim rotation with Kaiser normalization [31].
The analysis produced two factors with Eigenvalues greater
than 1, explaining a combined 79% of the total variance. The
first factor comprised all physiological sensors (all factor load-
ings >.61) including keystroke dynamics, while the second
factor comprised the five environmental sensors (all factor
loadings >.68). Concern about access to fingerprint sensors
loaded equally weak on both factors (with factor loadings of
.407 and .422 respectively).
As such, it seems as if people mentally cluster their concern
about access to sensor data. They have distinguishable concern
about access to environmental versus physiological data. We
therefore created two additional aggregate scores representing
these factors. Concern about fingerprint sensors was not in-
cluded in either score. In summary, we calculated the following
aggregate scores:
1) General concern about sensors generating data (i.e.,
how concerned users are about using the sensors in
general).
2) Concern about accessing party (i.e., how concerned
users are about the data being accessible to a specific
entity). We distinguish three types of entities: oneself,
familiar others (relatives and doctors) and unfamiliar
others (public and private organizations).
3) Concern about access to data types (i.e., how concerned
users are about a specific type of data being monitored
and accessed). We distinguish two types of data: envi-
ronmental (humidity, temperature, motion, pressure and
door states) and physiological (blood sugar, blood pres-
sure, grip, heart rate, skin reactivity, gait and keystroke
dynamics).
III. RESULTS
In the following, we will first discuss participants’ general
concern about the use of IoT sensors and the accessibility of
different types of data by different parties, analysed across all
participants. We will then focus on how beliefs about infer-
ability relate to data access concerns, additionally considering
the effect of the experimental manipulation (info vs. no-info
condition) on these concerns. Finally, we will exploratorily
analyse the role that users’ computer science background play
in their concern about data access.
A. General Concern (Descriptive)
Although the scale we used to assess this construct did not
have an objectively neutral midpoint, we decided to descrip-
tively analyse participants responses by testing their scores
against the scale midpoint, in order to get a rough estimate of
whether or not they tend to be concerned about using any or
all of the sensors. Across all types of sensors, participants
revealed a level of general concern that was significantly
lower than the scale midpoint: M = 3.48, SD = 1.52,
t(286) = −5.77, p < .001, d = −0.34. In fact, looking
at the individual sensors, participants only indicated general
concern higher than the scale midpoint for fingerprint data
(M = 4.79, SD = 2.02, t(286) = 6.62, p < .001, d = 0.39),
and – albeit not significantly – for keystroke data (M = 4.19,
SD = 2.25, t(286) = 1.43, p = .152, d = 0.08), while
all other scores averaged (sometimes marginally) significantly
below the midpoint, except for pressure data, which did not
significantly differ from the scale midpoint (p = .24).
In other words, participants were not overly concerned about
the possibility of having these sensors in their homes or
attached to their bodies, except for sensors gathering biometric
data. This high degree of concern may be due to the common
use of biometric sensors as means for personal identifications
and concern about either unwanted identification by untrusted
third parties or identity theft. In addition, based on the results
of the factor-analysis outlined above, we found that partici-
pants were in general not significantly more concerned about
having environmental sensors in their homes (M = 3.39,
SD = 1.59) than they were about having physiological
sensors attached to their bodies (M = 3.36, SD = 1.76,
t(286) = −0.44, p = .662, d = −0.02).
B. Data Access Concern
Results are different, however, when looking at people’s
concern about who can access their data. Across all types of
sensors, people’s concern about who has access to their data
was higher (M = 4.09, SD = 1.21) than their general concern
about having the sensors at home or attached to their bodies
(M = 3.48, SD = 1.52, t(286) = 7.20, p < .001, d = 0.43).
This indicates that people do not care as much about the
presence of the sensors per se, but rather about who can access
the measurements. Regarding the latter, people show a clear
pattern favouring familiarity. They are less concerned when
they have exclusive access to the data (M = 1.82, SD = 1.29)
than when familiar others have access (M = 3.67, SD = 1.62,
t(286) = −19.23, p < .001, d = −1.26), and less concerned
about familiar others than unfamiliar others (M = 5.64, SD =
1.59, t(286) = −23.12, p < .001, d = −1.22). Similarly,
participants clearly distinguish between which kind of data
is accessed (see Figure 1). Across all accessing parties, they
were more concerned about who has access to environmental
measures (M = 4.15, SD = 1.21) than to physiological
measures (M = 3.95, SD = 1.37, t(286) = 3.86, p < .001,
d = 0.15).
To get at a more detailed picture of this pattern, we
additionally ran a 2 (sensor type: environmental vs. physical)
x 3 (accessing party: self vs. familiar vs. unfamiliar) within-
subjects ANOVA that produced a significant interaction effect
(F (2, 286) = 26.45, p < .001, η2p = .085), displayed in
Figure 2. In addition to the two main effects detailed above,
the individual contrasts reveal that when people have exclusive
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Fig. 1. Mean concern expressed by participants with respect to each sensor.
Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
access to their data, they tend to be more concerned about
physiological data (M = 1.83, SD = 1.37) than about
environmental data (M = 1.72, SD = 1.28), t(286) = 2.44,
p = .015, d = 0.09).
This pattern flips, however, when data are accessed by
familiar and unfamiliar others. In these cases, people are
more concerned about unfamiliar others having access to
their environmental (M = 5.68, SD = 1.56) than to their
physiological measures (M = 5.53, SD = 1.79, t(286) =
2.37, p = .018, d = 0.08), and this applies even more so to
familiar others (M = 3.41, SD = 1.83 vs. M = 3.82, SD =
1.68, t(286) = 5.31, p < .001, d = 0.23). Correspondingly,
all three individual 2 x 2 interactions turned out statistically
significant (for all: p < .001 and η2p > .044).
We suggest two explanations for this pattern of results. First,
we believe that people are concerned about others knowing
about their private behaviour, which can be inferred from
environmental measures (e.g., who is in their house and what
activities they engage in). Especially familiar others could
directly confront them with certain (potentially embarrass-
ing) behaviours inferred from the sensor data. Second, the
potential benefit of enabling familiar others to access their
physiological data (e.g., to react appropriately in case of a
medical emergency) might account for the lower levels in
users’ concern about these parties accessing this type of data.
Why participants tend to be more concerned about the use of
physiological sensors than environmental sensors when they
themselves have exclusive access to the data (although concern
for both is relatively low overall) remains an open question.
One possible explanation could be that people perceive being
confronted with their vital signals as a stressor or constant
reminder of unhealthy habits, leading to a slight preference
for the use of environmental sensors.
*
***
*
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Fig. 2. Relation between access concerns and familiarity with the accessing
third party by data type. Asterisks indicate level of significance: * = p < .05,
** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
C. Knowledge About Possible Inferences
To answer our main question, we investigated how knowl-
edge/beliefs about how much can be inferred from sensor
data predicts usage and data access concerns. We found
that while stronger belief in how many inferences can be
drawn from measurement data did not predict general concern
about having the sensors at home or attached to one’s body
(β = .078, SE = .059, p = .190), it significantly predicted
concerns about who can access the data (β = .205, SE =
.058, p < .001).
In order to control for intercorrelation between the depen-
dent variables, we used a structural equation model (SEM)
to test how much participants’ belief uniquely predicted con-
cern about different parties potentially accessing their data
(across all sensor types). We found that a stronger belief
in inferability does not predict concern about data that only
oneself has access to (β = −.079, SE = .059, p = .177),
but it does significantly predict concern about familiar others
(β = .143, SE = .058, p = .031), and unfamiliar others
(β = .278, SE = .053, p < .001) having access to the
data (Figure 3). In both cases, greater belief in inferability
corresponded to higher levels of concern.
Comparing the different slopes, belief in how easy infer-
ences can be drawn from measurement data has a stronger
predictive effect for concern about familiar others access-
ing the data than for oneself accessing the data (βdiff =
.222, SE = .064, p < .001), and a stronger predictive effect
for concern about unfamiliar others than for familiar others
(βdiff = .134, SE = .051, p = .008) and oneself (βdiff =
.357, SE = .083, p < .001). As such, belief/knowledge about
how much can be inferred from sensor data is primarily
associated with concern about unfamiliar third parties ac-
cessing ones data. As a second SEM revealed, concern for
data produced by environmental versus physiological sensors
was not differently predicted by participants beliefs, βdiff =
.035, SE = .039, p = .358.
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Fig. 3. Relation between data access concerns and knowledge/beliefs about
inferability.
1) Experimental Manipulation: In addition, all participants
were assigned to one of two experimental conditions, in which
they either received information about the kind of data that
could potentially be inferred from the measurement data (info
condition), or they received no additional information (no-info
condition). Adding experimental conditions (info vs. no-info)
as an additional between-subjects factor to the sensory type ×
accessing party ANOVA (reported above) did not produce a
significant 2 x 3 x 2 interaction (F (2, 284) = 0.38, p = .680,
η2p = .003), nor did it significantly interact with either of
the other two factors (p = .817 and p = .414, respectively).
In other words, the manipulation did not differentially affect
participants’ concern about physiological versus environmental
data being accessed by them, familiar, and unfamiliar parties.
However, the manipulation produced a significant main
effect on people’s access concerns (F (1, 285) = 4.25, p = .04,
η2p = .003), in that receiving additional information about
what can be inferred from the measurement data increased
people’s access concerns across all sensors. Looking at the
individual sensors, the effects on humidity (t(285) = 2.16, p =
.031, d = 0.26), pressure (t(285) = 2.55, p = .011, d = 0.30),
and keystroke dynamics (t(258) = 2.17, p = .031, d = 0.26)
were statistically significant, with marginally significant effects
for temperature (t(285) = 1.80, p = .073, d = 0.21) and
heart rate sensors, t(285) = 1.79, p = .074, d = 0.21.
Across all sensors, the experimental manipulation did not
affect people’s general concern about having the sensors in
their homes or attached to their bodies (t(285) = 0.94, p =
.348, d = 0.11). Surprisingly, participants score reflecting their
belief/knowledge about how much can be inferred from sensor
data, which we used in our SEMs as predictor variable, was
not affected by having had exposure to additional information,
M = 7.17, SD = 1.59 vs. M = 7.20, SD = 1.67, t(285) =
0.15, p = .877, d = 0.02.
In sum, it seems as if beliefs/knowledge about how infer-
ences can be drawn from data is (causally) positively related
to the concern about who has access to such data. This seems
to be especially the case for access by unfamiliar third parties.
n.s.
n.s.
***
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Fig. 4. Relation between data access concerns and background in computer
science.
D. Knowledge About Computer Science and Other Demo-
graphics
In addition to the analyses detailed above, we also ex-
ploratorily analysed whether knowledge about computer sci-
ence predicts people’s concern about data access. While
general knowledge about computer science did not correlate
with belief in how much can be inferred from measurement
data (r(287) = 018, p = .759), a SEM revealed that this
knowledge positively predicts how concerned people are about
data to which only they have access (β = .206, SE =
.056, p < .001), while it did not predict concern about
access by familiar (β = .008, SE = .059, p = .891) or
unfamiliar (β = −.042, SE = .059, p = .476) third parties
(see Figure 4). Confirming this notion, the same pattern
was found for our binary variable asking participants about
whether or not they have an educational background in com-
puter science. While people with such a background were
more concerned about data to which only they have access
(n = 59,M = 2.13, SD = 1.62) than those without such
background (M = 1.73, SD = 1.18t(285) = 2.18, p = .030),
this was not the case for concern about others accessing their
data (familiar: p = .605, unfamiliar: p = .793).
One explanation for these results could be that advanced
knowledge about computer science may not necessarily be
related to knowledge about inferences that can be drawn from
data, but it may be associated with awareness of the fact that
data are almost never fully secure, and always potentially
accessible to malicious third parties. We further found that
knowledge about computer science positively correlated with
general concern about wearing the sensors or having them
at home (r(287) = .146, p = .014). This concern was
similarly predicted by the binary variable, with those who
have a background in computer science being more concerned
(M = 3.97, SD = 1.57) than those without (n = 228,M =
3.27, SD = 1.57, t(285) = 2.82, p = .005, d = 0.33).
This finding could likewise be related to advanced knowledge
about general data insecurity that people with a background
in computer sciences may have, regardless of inferences that
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could be drawn from the data.
Finally, we found that participants’ age correlated with
belief in inferability (r(287) = .171, p = .004), and concern
for who accesses their data (r(287) = .103, p < .082), with
an especially pronounced concern for access by public and
private organisations (r(287) = .176, p = .003). Age does also
negatively correlate with knowledge about computer science
(r(287) = −.120, p = .043). These findings are in line with
general findings about younger people having lesser concern
about sharing personal data with unfamiliar third parties [32].
IV. CONCLUSION
Thus far, little was known about how aware potential users
of IoT systems are of the inferences that can be drawn from
basic sensor data, and how such an awareness relates to
their concerns about using these devices depending on who
might access the data produced. In the present article, we
presented the results of an online study conducted with a US-
American participant pool, investigating users concerns about
the monitoring of (and others access to) environmental and
physiological sensor data. The following list sums up the main
findings from this study:
1) People mentally cluster sensor types into two cate-
gories (environmental and physiological sensors), and
have different levels of concern about access to the
data produced by these two types of sensors. They
further cluster accessing parties into three categories:
themselves, familiar others (doctors and relatives), and
unfamiliar others (public and private companies).
2) Global concern about using environmental and phys-
iological sensors is generally low and comparable in
strength, with the exception of biometric sensors, which
are typically used for identity verification and therefore
presumably associated with corresponding threats such
as identity theft.
3) Across sensors, users are more concerned about who
may potentially access their data than they are about
usage of the sensors per se.
4) Users are more concerned about data being accessible
to familiar others than about data being exclusively
accessible to themselves. Furthermore, they indicate an
even higher level of concern about data being accessible
to unfamiliar others.
5) Users are more concerned about familiar and unfamiliar
others accessing their environmental data than their
physiological data, presumably because environmental
data reveals more about private activities. Yet, deter-
mining the exact causes of this effect would require
additional studies.
6) Pertaining to our main research question, users who
believe more strongly that significant information can
be inferred from environmental and physiological data
are concerned to a greater degree about their data being
accessed by familiar and (even more strongly) unfamiliar
third parties.
7) Providing users with additional information about how
much can be inferred by combining sensor data increases
users’ concern about data access across sensor types and
accessing parties.
8) Knowledge about computer science predicts people’s
concern about data that is ostensibly only accessible
to them, presumably because such an educational back-
ground is associated with knowledge about the inherent
insecurity of data storage. However, additional research
would be necessary to adequately investigate this rela-
tionship.
One limitation of the present study is the fact that all
participants were located in the United States, a prototypical
W.E.I.R.D. culture (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich,
and Democratic [33]). Indeed, research has shown that culture
and environment play an important role in users’ concern for
privacy [34]. Westin [35] talks about privacy as “an instrument
for achieving individual goals of self-realization” (p. 39). Yet,
such goals may critically depend on peoples self-construal. For
example, whether people define themselves in terms of their
group membership (i.e., and interdependent self-construal) -
more frequently encountered in Asian cultures - as opposed
to their internal attributes (i.e., an independent self-construal),
was found to affect their concerns for privacy [36]. Drawing
on these findings, it would certainly be a worthwhile research
endeavour to replicate the present study within different cul-
tural contexts.
One should further note that the present study was adminis-
tered with the help of an online data collection service. Despite
its convenience for the researcher, such an approach artificially
limits participants to those with sufficient knowledge about
new technologies to know and use this service. Whether people
who lack this knowledge would consider using IoT devices,
and whether their privacy concerns diverge from the present
findings, can similarly not be answered without further (and
more sophisticated) data collection, for example by using more
representative samples. However, an exploratory analysis of
the present dataset suggests that knowledge about computer
science has indeed some effects on peoples privacy concerns.
In addition, although our results point towards the notion
that knowledge about inferences affect peoples concerns about
who may potentially access their data, our study did not
investigate behavioural consequences of these concerns. In
other words, it remains unclear whether people are more or less
willing to actually use IoT devices, whether they would only
acquire them if they come from a trusted source, or whether
they would willingly share their datafor example with health
professionals. As in the case of the other limitations, future
research may address some of these questions.
Lastly, the question remains whether and how peoples
minds could be changed when it comes to their concerns for
privacy in the IoT context. As the present research shows,
even providing them with information about what can be
inferred about their personal behaviour and their physiological
constitution by combining data from various IoT sensors does
not increase their concerns to a degree that would make them
considerably more cautious about owning such devices in the
future. Further, it is unlikely that information about inferability
would be relied to the consumer by the manufactures of these
devices. As such, thorough education of people of all ages
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about the benefits and risks of utilising content aware systems
remains a critical endeavour in the digital ageespecially con-
sidering the growing presence of such systems in homes, smart
devices, or even public spaces.
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